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# Permissions

Permissions can be used to control what system resources the
Node.js process has access to or what actions the process can take
with those resources. Permissions can also control what modules can
be accessed by other modules.

* [Module-based permissions](#module-based-permissions) control which files
  or URLs are available to other modules during application execution.
  This can be used to control what modules can be accessed by third-party
  dependencies, for example.

* [Process-based permissions](#process-based-permissions) control the Node.js
  process's access to resources.
  The resource can be entirely allowed or denied, or actions related to it can
  be controlled. For example, file system reads can be allowed while denying
  writes.
  This feature does not protect against malicious code. According to the Node.js
  [Security Policy][], Node.js trusts any code it is asked to run.

The permission model implements a "seat belt" approach, which prevents trusted
code from unintentionally changing files or using resources that access has
not explicitly been granted to. It does not provide security guarantees in the
presence of malicious code. Malicious code can bypass the permission model and
execute arbitrary code without the restrictions imposed by the permission
model.

If you find a potential security vulnerability, please refer to our
[Security Policy][].

## Module-based permissions

### Policies

<!--introduced_in=v11.8.0-->

<!-- type=misc -->

> Stability: 0 - Deprecated: Will be removed shortly

<!-- name=policy -->

Node.js contains experimental support for creating policies on loading code.

Policies are a security feature intended to ensure the integrity
of the loaded code.

While it does not function as a provenance mechanism to trace the origin of
code, it serves as a robust defense against the execution of malicious code.
Unlike runtime-based models that may restrict capabilities once the code is
loaded, Node.js policies focus on preventing malicious code from ever being
fully loaded into the application in the first place.

The use of policies assumes safe practices for the policy
files such as ensuring that policy files cannot be overwritten by the Node.js
application by using file permissions.

A best practice would be to ensure that the policy manifest is read-only for
the running Node.js application and that the file cannot be changed
by the running Node.js application in any way. A typical setup would be to
create the policy file as a different user id than the one running Node.js
and granting read permissions to the user id running Node.js.

#### Enabling

<!-- type=misc -->

The `--experimental-policy` flag can be used to enable features for policies
when loading modules.

Once this has been set, all modules must conform to a policy manifest file
passed to the flag:

```bash
node --experimental-policy=policy.json app.js
```

The policy manifest will be used to enforce constraints on code loaded by
Node.js.

To mitigate tampering with policy files on disk, an integrity for
the policy file itself may be provided via `--policy-integrity`.
This allows running `node` and asserting the policy file contents
even if the file is changed on disk.

```bash
node --experimental-policy=policy.json --policy-integrity="sha384-SggXRQHwCG8g+DktYYzxkXRIkTiEYWBHqev0xnpCxYlqMBufKZHAHQM3/boDaI/0" app.js
```

#### Features

##### Error behavior

When a policy check fails, Node.js by default will throw an error.
It is possible to change the error behavior to one of a few possibilities
by defining an "onerror" field in a policy manifest. The following values are
available to change the behavior:

* `"exit"`: will exit the process immediately.
  No cleanup code will be allowed to run.
* `"log"`: will log the error at the site of the failure.
* `"throw"`: will throw a JS error at the site of the failure. This is the
  default.

```json
{
  "onerror": "log",
  "resources": {
    "./app/checked.js": {
      "integrity": "sha384-SggXRQHwCG8g+DktYYzxkXRIkTiEYWBHqev0xnpCxYlqMBufKZHAHQM3/boDaI/0"
    }
  }
}
```

##### Integrity checks

Policy files must use integrity checks with Subresource Integrity strings
compatible with the browser
[integrity attribute](https://www.w3.org/TR/SRI/#the-integrity-attribute)
associated with absolute URLs.

When using `require()` or `import` all resources involved in loading are checked
for integrity if a policy manifest has been specified. If a resource does not
match the integrity listed in the manifest, an error will be thrown.

An example policy file that would allow loading a file `checked.js`:

```json
{
  "resources": {
    "./app/checked.js": {
      "integrity": "sha384-SggXRQHwCG8g+DktYYzxkXRIkTiEYWBHqev0xnpCxYlqMBufKZHAHQM3/boDaI/0"
    }
  }
}
```

Each resource listed in the policy manifest can be of one the following
formats to determine its location:

1. A [relative-URL string][] to a resource from the manifest such as `./resource.js`, `../resource.js`, or `/resource.js`.
2. A complete URL string to a resource such as `file:///resource.js`.

When loading resources the entire URL must match including search parameters
and hash fragment. `./a.js?b` will not be used when attempting to load
`./a.js` and vice versa.

To generate integrity strings, a script such as
`node -e 'process.stdout.write("sha256-");process.stdin.pipe(crypto.createHash("sha256").setEncoding("base64")).pipe(process.stdout)' < FILE`
can be used.

Integrity can be specified as the boolean value `true` to accept any
body for the resource which can be useful for local development. It is not
recommended in production since it would allow unexpected alteration of
resources to be considered valid.

##### Dependency redirection

An application may need to ship patched versions of modules or to prevent
modules from allowing all modules access to all other modules. Redirection
can be used by intercepting attempts to load the modules wishing to be
replaced.

```json
{
  "resources": {
    "./app/checked.js": {
      "dependencies": {
        "fs": true,
        "os": "./app/node_modules/alt-os",
        "http": { "import": true }
      }
    }
  }
}
```

The dependencies are keyed by the requested specifier string and have values
of either `true`, `null`, a string pointing to a module to be resolved,
or a conditions object.

The specifier string does not perform any searching and must match exactly what
is provided to the `require()` or `import` except for a canonicalization step.
Therefore, multiple specifiers may be needed in the policy if it uses multiple
different strings to point to the same module (such as excluding the extension).

Specifier strings are canonicalized but not resolved prior to be used for
matching in order to have some compatibility with import maps, for example if a
resource `file:///C:/app/utils.js` was given the following redirection from a
policy located at `file:///C:/app/policy.json`:

```json
{
  "resources": {
    "file:///C:/app/utils.js": {
      "dependencies": {
        "./utils.js": "./utils-v2.js"
      }
    }
  }
}
```

Any specifier used to load `file:///C:/app/utils.js` would then be intercepted
and redirected to `file:///C:/app/utils-v2.js` instead regardless of using an
absolute or relative specifier. However, if a specifier that is not an absolute
or relative URL string is used, it would not be intercepted. So, if an import
such as `import('#utils')` was used, it would not be intercepted.

If the value of the redirection is `true`, a "dependencies" field at the top of
the policy file will be used. If that field at the top of the policy file is
`true` the default node searching algorithms are used to find the module.

If the value of the redirection is a string, it is resolved relative to
the manifest and then immediately used without searching.

Any specifier string for which resolution is attempted and that is not listed in
the dependencies results in an error according to the policy.

A boolean value of `true` for the dependencies map can be specified to allow a
module to load any specifier without redirection. This can be useful for local
development and may have some valid usage in production, but should be used
only with care after auditing a module to ensure its behavior is valid.

Similar to `"exports"` in `package.json`, dependencies can also be specified to
be objects containing conditions which branch how dependencies are loaded. In
the preceding example, `"http"` is allowed when the `"import"` condition is
part of loading it.

A value of `null` for the resolved value causes the resolution to fail. This
can be used to ensure some kinds of dynamic access are explicitly prevented.

Unknown values for the resolved module location cause failures but are
not guaranteed to be forward compatible.

All the guarantees for policy redirection are specified in the
[Guarantees](#guarantees) section.

##### Example: Patched dependency

Redirected dependencies can provide attenuated or modified functionality as fits
the application. For example, log data about timing of function durations by
wrapping the original:

```js
const original = require('fn');
module.exports = function fn(...args) {
  console.time();
  try {
    return new.target ?
      Reflect.construct(original, args) :
      Reflect.apply(original, this, args);
  } finally {
    console.timeEnd();
  }
};
```

#### Scopes

Use the `"scopes"` field of a manifest to set configuration for many resources
at once. The `"scopes"` field works by matching resources by their segments.
If a scope or resource includes `"cascade": true`, unknown specifiers will
be searched for in their containing scope. The containing scope for cascading
is found by recursively reducing the resource URL by removing segments for
[special schemes][], keeping trailing `"/"` suffixes, and removing the query and
hash fragment. This leads to the eventual reduction of the URL to its origin.
If the URL is non-special the scope will be located by the URL's origin. If no
scope is found for the origin or in the case of opaque origins, a protocol
string can be used as a scope. If no scope is found for the URL's protocol, a
final empty string `""` scope will be used.

Note, `blob:` URLs adopt their origin from the path they contain, and so a scope
of `"blob:https://nodejs.org"` will have no effect since no URL can have an
origin of `blob:https://nodejs.org`; URLs starting with
`blob:https://nodejs.org/` will use `https://nodejs.org` for its origin and
thus `https:` for its protocol scope. For opaque origin `blob:` URLs they will
have `blob:` for their protocol scope since they do not adopt origins.

##### Example

```json
{
  "scopes": {
    "file:///C:/app/": {},
    "file:": {},
    "": {}
  }
}
```

Given a file located at `file:///C:/app/bin/main.js`, the following scopes would
be checked in order:

1. `"file:///C:/app/bin/"`

This determines the policy for all file based resources within
`"file:///C:/app/bin/"`. This is not in the `"scopes"` field of the policy and
would be skipped. Adding this scope to the policy would cause it to be used
prior to the `"file:///C:/app/"` scope.

2. `"file:///C:/app/"`

This determines the policy for all file based resources within
`"file:///C:/app/"`. This is in the `"scopes"` field of the policy and it would
determine the policy for the resource at `file:///C:/app/bin/main.js`. If the
scope has `"cascade": true`, any unsatisfied queries about the resource would
delegate to the next relevant scope for `file:///C:/app/bin/main.js`, `"file:"`.

3. `"file:///C:/"`

This determines the policy for all file based resources within `"file:///C:/"`.
This is not in the `"scopes"` field of the policy and would be skipped. It would
not be used for `file:///C:/app/bin/main.js` unless `"file:///C:/app/"` is set
to cascade or is not in the `"scopes"` of the policy.

4. `"file:///"`

This determines the policy for all file based resources on the `localhost`. This
is not in the `"scopes"` field of the policy and would be skipped. It would not
be used for `file:///C:/app/bin/main.js` unless `"file:///C:/"` is set to
cascade or is not in the `"scopes"` of the policy.

5. `"file:"`

This determines the policy for all file based resources. It would not be used
for `file:///C:/app/bin/main.js` unless `"file:///"` is set to cascade or is not
in the `"scopes"` of the policy.

6. `""`

This determines the policy for all resources. It would not be used for
`file:///C:/app/bin/main.js` unless `"file:"` is set to cascade.

##### Integrity using scopes

Setting an integrity to `true` on a scope will set the integrity for any
resource not found in the manifest to `true`.

Setting an integrity to `null` on a scope will set the integrity for any
resource not found in the manifest to fail matching.

Not including an integrity is the same as setting the integrity to `null`.

`"cascade"` for integrity checks will be ignored if `"integrity"` is explicitly
set.

The following example allows loading any file:

```json
{
  "scopes": {
    "file:": {
      "integrity": true
    }
  }
}
```

##### Dependency redirection using scopes

The following example, would allow access to `fs` for all resources within
`./app/`:

```json
{
  "resources": {
    "./app/checked.js": {
      "cascade": true,
      "integrity": true
    }
  },
  "scopes": {
    "./app/": {
      "dependencies": {
        "fs": true
      }
    }
  }
}
```

The following example, would allow access to `fs` for all `data:` resources:

```json
{
  "resources": {
    "data:text/javascript,import('node:fs');": {
      "cascade": true,
      "integrity": true
    }
  },
  "scopes": {
    "data:": {
      "dependencies": {
        "fs": true
      }
    }
  }
}
```

##### Example: import maps emulation

Given an import map:

```json
{
  "imports": {
    "react": "./app/node_modules/react/index.js"
  },
  "scopes": {
    "./ssr/": {
      "react": "./app/node_modules/server-side-react/index.js"
    }
  }
}
```

```json
{
  "dependencies": true,
  "scopes": {
    "": {
      "cascade": true,
      "dependencies": {
        "react": "./app/node_modules/react/index.js"
      }
    },
    "./ssr/": {
      "cascade": true,
      "dependencies": {
        "react": "./app/node_modules/server-side-react/index.js"
      }
    }
  }
}
```

[Import maps][] assume you can get any resource by default. This means
`"dependencies"` at the top level of the policy should be set to `true`.
Policies require this to be opt-in since it enables all resources of the
application cross linkage which doesn't make sense for many scenarios. They also
assume any given scope has access to any scope above its allowed dependencies;
all scopes emulating import maps must set `"cascade": true`.

Import maps only have a single top level scope for their "imports". So for
emulating `"imports"` use the `""` scope. For emulating `"scopes"` use the
`"scopes"` in a similar manner to how `"scopes"` works in import maps.

Caveats: Policies do not use string matching for various finding of scope. They
do URL traversals. This means things like `blob:` and `data:` URLs might not be
entirely interoperable between the two systems. For example import maps can
partially match a `data:` or `blob:` URL by partitioning the URL on a `/`
character, policies intentionally cannot. For `blob:` URLs import map scopes do
not adopt the origin of the `blob:` URL.

Additionally, import maps only work on `import` so it may be desirable to add a
`"import"` condition to all dependency mappings.

#### Guarantees

* The policies guarantee the file integrity when a module is loaded using
  `require()`, `import()` or `new Module()`.
* Redirection does not prevent access to APIs through means such as direct
  access to `require.cache` which allow access to loaded modules.
  Policy redirection only affects specifiers to `require()` and
  `import`.
* The approval of the module integrity in policies threat model implies
  they are allowed to muck with and even circumvent security features once
  loaded so environmental/runtime hardening is expected.

## Process-based permissions

### Permission Model

<!-- type=misc -->

> Stability: 1.1 - Active development

<!-- name=permission-model -->

The Node.js Permission Model is a mechanism for restricting access to specific
resources during execution.
The API exists behind a flag [`--experimental-permission`][] which when enabled,
will restrict access to all available permissions.

The available permissions are documented by the [`--experimental-permission`][]
flag.

When starting Node.js with `--experimental-permission`,
the ability to access the file system through the `fs` module, spawn processes,
use `node:worker_threads`, use native addons, use WASI, and enable the runtime inspector
will be restricted.

```console
$ node --experimental-permission index.js
node:internal/modules/cjs/loader:171
  const result = internalModuleStat(filename);
                 ^

Error: Access to this API has been restricted
    at stat (node:internal/modules/cjs/loader:171:18)
    at Module._findPath (node:internal/modules/cjs/loader:627:16)
    at resolveMainPath (node:internal/modules/run_main:19:25)
    at Function.executeUserEntryPoint [as runMain] (node:internal/modules/run_main:76:24)
    at node:internal/main/run_main_module:23:47 {
  code: 'ERR_ACCESS_DENIED',
  permission: 'FileSystemRead',
  resource: '/home/user/index.js'
}
```

Allowing access to spawning a process and creating worker threads can be done
using the [`--allow-child-process`][] and [`--allow-worker`][] respectively.

To allow native addons when using permission model, use the [`--allow-addons`][]
flag. For WASI, use the [`--allow-wasi`][] flag.

#### Runtime API

When enabling the Permission Model through the [`--experimental-permission`][]
flag a new property `permission` is added to the `process` object.
This property contains one function:

##### `permission.has(scope[, reference])`

API call to check permissions at runtime ([`permission.has()`][])

```js
process.permission.has('fs.write'); // true
process.permission.has('fs.write', '/home/rafaelgss/protected-folder'); // true

process.permission.has('fs.read'); // true
process.permission.has('fs.read', '/home/rafaelgss/protected-folder'); // false
```

#### File System Permissions

The Permission Model, by default, restricts access to the file system through the `node:fs` module.
It does not guarantee that users will not be able to access the file system through other means,
such as through the `node:sqlite` module.

To allow access to the file system, use the [`--allow-fs-read`][] and
[`--allow-fs-write`][] flags:

```console
$ node --experimental-permission --allow-fs-read=* --allow-fs-write=* index.js
Hello world!
(node:19836) ExperimentalWarning: Permission is an experimental feature
(Use `node --trace-warnings ...` to show where the warning was created)
```

The valid arguments for both flags are:

* `*` - To allow all `FileSystemRead` or `FileSystemWrite` operations,
  respectively.
* Paths delimited by comma (`,`) to allow only matching `FileSystemRead` or
  `FileSystemWrite` operations, respectively.

Example:

* `--allow-fs-read=*` - It will allow all `FileSystemRead` operations.
* `--allow-fs-write=*` - It will allow all `FileSystemWrite` operations.
* `--allow-fs-write=/tmp/` - It will allow `FileSystemWrite` access to the `/tmp/`
  folder.
* `--allow-fs-read=/tmp/ --allow-fs-read=/home/.gitignore` - It allows `FileSystemRead` access
  to the `/tmp/` folder **and** the `/home/.gitignore` path.

Wildcards are supported too:

* `--allow-fs-read=/home/test*` will allow read access to everything
  that matches the wildcard. e.g: `/home/test/file1` or `/home/test2`

After passing a wildcard character (`*`) all subsequent characters will
be ignored. For example: `/home/*.js` will work similar to `/home/*`.

When the permission model is initialized, it will automatically add a wildcard
(\*) if the specified directory exists. For example, if `/home/test/files`
exists, it will be treated as `/home/test/files/*`. However, if the directory
does not exist, the wildcard will not be added, and access will be limited to
`/home/test/files`. If you want to allow access to a folder that does not exist
yet, make sure to explicitly include the wildcard:
`/my-path/folder-do-not-exist/*`.

#### Permission Model constraints

There are constraints you need to know before using this system:

* The model does not inherit to a child node process or a worker thread.
* When using the Permission Model the following features will be restricted:
  * Native modules
  * Child process
  * Worker Threads
  * Inspector protocol
  * File system access
  * WASI
* The Permission Model is initialized after the Node.js environment is set up.
  However, certain flags such as `--env-file` or `--openssl-config` are designed
  to read files before environment initialization. As a result, such flags are
  not subject to the rules of the Permission Model. The same applies for V8
  flags that can be set via runtime through `v8.setFlagsFromString`.
* OpenSSL engines cannot be requested at runtime when the Permission
  Model is enabled, affecting the built-in crypto, https, and tls modules.
* Using existing file descriptors via the `node:fs` module bypasses the
  Permission Model.

#### Limitations and Known Issues

* Symbolic links will be followed even to locations outside of the set of paths
  that access has been granted to. Relative symbolic links may allow access to
  arbitrary files and directories. When starting applications with the
  permission model enabled, you must ensure that no paths to which access has
  been granted contain relative symbolic links.

[Import maps]: https://url.spec.whatwg.org/#relative-url-with-fragment-string
[Security Policy]: https://github.com/nodejs/node/blob/main/SECURITY.md
[`--allow-addons`]: cli.md#--allow-addons
[`--allow-child-process`]: cli.md#--allow-child-process
[`--allow-fs-read`]: cli.md#--allow-fs-read
[`--allow-fs-write`]: cli.md#--allow-fs-write
[`--allow-wasi`]: cli.md#--allow-wasi
[`--allow-worker`]: cli.md#--allow-worker
[`--experimental-permission`]: cli.md#--experimental-permission
[`permission.has()`]: process.md#processpermissionhasscope-reference
[relative-url string]: https://url.spec.whatwg.org/#relative-url-with-fragment-string
[special schemes]: https://url.spec.whatwg.org/#special-scheme

Anon7 - 2022
AnonSec Team